Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) generate valuable knowledge about network security, but an abundance of false alarms and a lack of methods to capture the interdependence among alerts hampers their utility for network defense. Here, we explore a graph-based approach for fusing alerts generated by multiple IDSs (e.g., Snort, OSSEC, and Bro). Our approach generates a weighted graph of alert elds (not network topology) that makes explicit the connections between multiple alerts, IDS systems, and other cyber artifacts. We use this multi-modal graph to identify anomalous changes in the alert pa erns of a network. To detect the anomalies, we apply the role-dynamics approach, which has successfully identi ed anomalies in social media, email, and IP communication graphs. In the cyber domain, each node (alert eld) in the fused IDS alert graph is assigned a probability distribution across a small set of roles based on that node's features. A cyber a ack should trigger IDS alerts and cause changes in the node features, but rather than track every feature for every alert-eld node individually, roles provide a succinct, integrated summary of those feature changes. We measure changes in each node's probabilistic role assignment over time, and identify anomalies as deviations from expected roles.
INTRODUCTION
Sophisticated modern cyber a ackers, such as Advanced Persistent reats (APTs), pose a serious threat to critical cyber infrastructure. e term APT generally refers to experienced cyber groups that are directed and supported by governments, corporations, terrorist groups, or other entities motivated by political and economic gain [11, 15, 22] . APTs have successfully in ltrated democratic institutions [15] , health insurance companies [15] , and nancial institutions (e.g., Equifax [6, 17] ). Speci c goals di er and vary over time; prior a acks have ex ltrated sensitive data (e.g., OPM breach) and crippled physical infrastructure (e.g., Stuxnet). Lemay et al. [15] provide an overview of recent APTs.
Defending against these advanced a acks has proven di cult. APTs leverage social engineering, build advanced cyber-a ack tools, and exploit target-speci c vulnerabilities [3, 4, [13] [14] [15] 20] . Some APTs have altered tactics a er their methods have been divulged or countered [3, 4, 14, 15, 20] . Most prioritize stealth to maintain longterm access and distribute a ack steps over months or years [5] to temporally separate indicators of compromise. ese aspects make each APT a ack unique in most respects, and traditional signaturebased detection schemes are mostly ine ective for detecting them.
is is con rmed in [21] , which found that in 86% of cases, evidence about the data breach was recorded in the organization logs, but the detection mechanisms failed to raise security alarms.
Detecting APTs in networks remains a top research priority [5] . Detection provides opportunities to: mobilize cyber defense; further study state-of-the-art tactics, techniques, and procedures; a ribute an a ack to a speci c APT or supporting organization; and initiate counter a acks. Although APT methods vary, previous work has outlined abstract phases that characterize the sequence of events in an a ack. A widely used example is the intrusion kill chain [11] : (i) reconnaissance, (ii) weaponization, (iii) delivery, (iv) exploitation, (v) installation, (vi) command and control, and (vii) actions on objectives.
Regardless of the abstraction, a ack steps during these phases leave detectable artifacts. ese artifacts, though incomplete, provide important information about APTs. Much of our knowledge about APTs results from cyber forensic investigations of these artifacts (e.g., [15] ). e success of cyber forensic analyses (e.g., [7, 13] ) suggests that a su ciently advanced system may be able to provide early detection from these artifacts. A key challenge is developing a method capable of correlating indicators of compromise (IOCs) widely spread in time and modality.
We present a machine learning approach for detecting a acks from cyber artifacts. Our approach uses unsupervised graph-based anomaly detection [1] . Graphs easily fuse multi-modal data and explicitly capture connections between artifacts that are otherwise absent or only implicit in non-graph methods (e.g., [12] ). Note that the graph represents connections between artifacts, and not network topology. Two hosts that frequently communicate may not be directly connected in the graph, just as two hosts that never communicate may be linked by artifacts.
Our unsupervised method learns the artifacts generated by normal network usage and ags anomalies in new data for further inspection. It does not require labeled training data. We demonstrate our graph-based anomaly detector by analyzing alert logs generated by network and host intrusion detection systems (IDSs). While APTs may use custom tools or zero-day exploits that circumvent IDSs, it is also not uncommon for APTs, in some phases, to use more widely available malware that does trigger alerts from IDSs [22] . A common problem with IDSs is alarm fatigue; a acks may trigger IDS alerts, but so does normal network usage [12] .
is allows an APT, even while generating IDS alerts, to remain undetected in a network. Problematically, the same alerts may be triggered by both normal usage and while under an a ack, so APT detection requires more than careful IDS tuning. Instead, the challenge is to identify when a set of IDS alerts are triggered by normal activity (false alarms) and when they are triggered by an a ack (true alarms).
We test our method using a virtual network that simulates both normal usage and a acks characteristic of the Hurricane Panda and Energetic Bear APTs [15] . Our experiments show that graph feature anomalies are sensitive indicators of APT-like tactics, techniques, and procedures and other types of cyber a acks.
CYBER ARTIFACT FUSION USING GRAPHS
Indications of a cyber a ack are o en split across modalities. A SQL injection a ack, for example, may trigger alerts from a network IDS [2] , while adding new admin users may trigger a di erent, host-based IDS 1 . Rather than treat these alerts as independent, an artifact graph explicitly captures the links between the alerts. In this example, those links might include overlapping IP addresses if both a acks involved the same machine.
IDS alerts are typically forma ed as structured text where the elds are populated by variables related to the triggering event ( Figure 1 ). We organize the elds as layers in the graph (e.g., an IP address layer), with nodes that represent unique instances of the variables (e.g., a speci c IP address). Edges connect nodes that appear in the same alert, incrementing in weight for each additional co-occurrence. e pseudocode in Algorithm 1 summarizes our multi-modal data fusion (graph building) algorithm. 1 h ps://ossec.github.io/ Every artifact type includes elds that vary in relevancy to detecting cyber artifacts. Here we use a subset of alert elds that provide orthogonal information. e classi cation message for a Snort alert, for example, maps to a speci c signature ID. As the message can be reconstructed from the ID, the classi cation message does not provide new information and is excluded. For Snort alerts, we use the signature ID and the source and destination IP addresses. For OSSEC alerts, we use the source IP address (when available) and convert the hostname elds to their corresponding IP address. We also include the rule ID and the log le that generated the alert.
A graph-based approach has several advantages for detecting cyber a acks from artifacts:
• Context from alert interdependencies. IDSs generate many di erent types of alerts (e.g., suspicious packets, failed logins). Although they may indicate di erent activities, alerts are not independent. For example, both alerts in Figure 1 reference IP address 10.10.255.77. e graph structure explicitly links these alerts through their shared IP address node. Each alert is thus considered in the context of the other alerts in the network, which can help identify anomalies in the alert data. An alert signaling a failed login a empt, for example, may not itself be unusual. But a failed login a empt accompanied by other linked alerts in the graph may be signi cant. • IDS fusion and e cient representation. e graph fuses together alerts generated by disparate IDSs. Figure 1 , for example, shows the fusion of alerts from a network IDS (Snort) and a host IDS (OSSEC). Other IDSs that generate alerts with overlapping elds are straightforward to include in the graph. By representing elds as nodes, we can e ciently represent the alert structure. Each panel in Figure 2 represents a time window with over 3,000 alerts in a single, compact graph with about 50 nodes and 200 weighted edges. • Robust to circumvention. Akoglu et al. [1] argue that graphbased detectors are especially di cult for adversaries to circumvent. Due to the interconnected nature of the artifact graph, an adversary would need a global view of the normal network operations (that is, the behavior of all alerts) to evade the anomaly detector. As a result, graphbased methods are widely used in fraud detection and may prove especially di cult for cyber a ackers to circumvent. 
GRAPH-NODE ROLES
Anomalies in the artifact graph are de ned as unusual changes (over time) in the graph features. Graphs contain many diverse features (e.g., degree, page-rank) but the features that are most sensitive to a cyber a ack are not known in advance and may change over time.
Instead of manual selection, we automatically determine the salient features and use machine learning to identify anomalies from this expanded feature set ( Figure 3 ).
Recursive Feature Extraction
We use recursive feature extraction (ReFex) [10] to automatically generate feature vectors for every node in the artifact graph because it scales well and has proven successful in other applications (e.g., [16] ). ese feature vectors form the matrix, V nf , where n are the nodes and f are the features. Recursive features are calculated over the node's neighbors, such as the mean of neighbor node degrees. Recursion continues until new recursive features are approximately linearly dependent on prior features. Here, we use both the sums and the means of neighbor node features.
e ReFex algorithm begins the recursive feature extraction with a set of primary graph features for each node: (i) the number of connected nodes (degree), (ii) the number of edges connecting its neighbors (ego-network interconnectivity), and (iii) the number of edges connecting its neighbors to other parts of the graph (egonetwork out-degree). In the IDS artifact graph, edges are weighted by the number of alerts containing the connection, so we substitute weighted degree for degree to increase sensitivity to alert frequency. We also add transitivity as a fourth feature to quantify the connections between the node's neighbors. For example, if an IP address node is connected to both a rule node and a second IP address, the node's transitivity increases if the rule is also connected to the second IP address node. is might occur, for example, if both IPs were victim to the same intrusion a empt.
Dimensionality Reduction via Role Extraction
Anomaly detection is di cult in the high-dimensional space created by the expanded feature set. Rather than model every feature of every node for anomalies, it is convenient to summarize and model a reduced feature set. We use the role extraction algorithm (RolX [9] ) for dimensionality reduction. RolX is an unsupervised, scalable (linear in the number of graph edges) so -clustering algorithm that reduces the features to a small set of roles. In RolX, the node-feature matrix is factorized as
where G nr is a node-role matrix in which each row quanti es the membership of a node in each role, r , and F r f is a role-feature matrix where each row de nes a role in terms of the features. Non-Negative Matrix Factorization ensures role membership and feature importance are always positive [19] , as negative values are di cult to interpret.
Role Number Optimization
Evaluating (1) requires se ing the number of roles: too few and changes in the graph may not result in role changes (increasing false negatives); too many and a node may uctuate between two nearly identical roles (increasing false positives). e optimal number of nodes can be determined automatically [9] using the Minimum Description Length criterion (MDL) [18] . e application of MDL is based on the insight that roles compress the node-feature matrix. Recall that the factorization in (1) is approximate; as the number of roles increases, the factorization accuracy increases but so does the model complexity. MDL balances this trade-o between accuracy and complexity by minimizing the description length L = M + E, where M is the model description cost and E is the error cost. M is simply equal to N b N r (N n + N f ) where N b is the number of bits per value, and N n , N f , and N r , are the numbers of nodes, features, and roles. Note that N r (N n + N f ) is the total number of entries in G nr and F r f . e error cost, E, is calculated using the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the node-feature matrix and the factorization,
where the primes indicate the matrices are encoded using N b bits. N b and N r are generally small integers, so a simple grid search reveals the minimum L. Figure 4 shows the results from a graph constructed from the rst seven days of the Hurricane-Panda-like APT scenario (described in Section 5.2). Each box in the grid is colored according to the description length L for that pair of N b bits and N r roles. e optimal number of roles for this graph is three.
Role Descriptions
A key advantage of RolX is interpretability; roles can be described in terms of intuitive features such as degree, betweenness, or pagerank. e features re ect the structural behavior of the nodes (e.g., periphery-nodes, clique-members), and are complementary to communities [8] . Compact, feature-based descriptions are especially helpful for understanding large graphs that cannot be easily visualized.
Structural descriptions may be useful to investigate:
• the features that de ne a speci c role (e.g., Role 3 is de ned by high betweenness values), • why a node has been assigned a particular role (e.g., IP address node 10.10.255.69 was assigned Role 2 because of its high transitivity and eccentricity properties), or • why a node has changed roles (e.g., rule node 20005 switched from Role 1 to Role 3 during the latest time step due to a large increase in betweenness).
Role descriptions are calculated by nding the non-negative matrix, E r p , where each role, r , is described in terms of node properties, p, (e.g., degree, betweenness, etc.) [9] ,
where M np is a matrix of the properties for each node, and is calculated directly from the graph. e contribution of each property is normalized relative to the other properties, and to its contribution in the case of a single role, E r p /E r p , where the prime indicates the matrix was calculated using a single role. Note that these properties, p, are distinct from the recursive features, f , used in the role de nitions; properties are not recursive and are manually chosen to aid comprehension. e role descriptions for the Hurricane-Panda-like scenario are shown in Figure 5 .
ANOMALY DETECTION -GRAPH-NODE ROLE-DYNAMICS
To identify anomalies, we divide the IDS alerts into a set of time windows, t, and use a training period to de ne a xed role-feature matrix F r f . We bin the remaining IDS alerts into sequential time windows, executing the following steps for each window:
Step 1: Collect and fuse artifacts to populate the artifact graph for the current window. Step 2: Extract graph features to create a node-feature matrix V nf (t) (e.g., ReFex [10] ). Step 3: Summarize features using RolX [9] , assigning each node a distribution over the roles. Step 4: Calculate the role distribution for each node as a function of time. Together, Steps 2-4 comprise role-dynamics described in [19] and below.
Step 5: Analyze the probabilistic role assignments over time to identify anomalous changes in the roles.
Step 6: Investigate the anomaly cause.
To ensure that the role de nitions are consistent across time steps, we modify (1) to calculate role distributions using the xed role de nitions, F r f ,
F r f is initially de ned during the training period but can be updated periodically to adapt role de nitions to changes in normalcy pa erns. G nr (t) encodes a time-series for each node-role pair. ere are many ways to analyze time series data for anomalies; here we analyze the average role change across all node-role pairs,
where P n (t) is the maximum role membership probability for node n in time window t. Nodes will not necessarily appear in every time window, and P n (t) is set to null until its rst occurance. Once a node appears, its previous probability of role membership lls forward into new time bins where n V . For the scenarios here, se ing a constant threshold on ∆r (t) is su cient to identify anomalies corresponding to the start of the a acks.
TEST AND EVALUATION 5.1 Simulation
To evaluate the ability of our approach to identify anomalies in IDS alerts, we use IDS alerts generated from a network of virtual machines (Windows and Linux workstations, data servers, print servers, and DNS servers), virtual switches, and a virtual server that approximates connections to the internet ( Figure 6 ). e network includes installations of Snort and OSSEC which generated alerts throughout the experiment. 
Internet
Wireless Access Point Figure 6 : e simulated network consists of 24 virtual machines (Windows and Linux workstations, as well as data, print, and DNS servers), virtual switches, and a virtual server approximating connections to the internet. e simulations include three weeks of normal network operations, background tra c (packet ow), and IDS alerts, as well as two distinct APT-like cyber a acks that occur near the end of each simulation. We used the rst week of the simulation (all prior to the a ack) to obtain the initial role de nitions, F r f , and the optimal number of roles. e remaining alerts are divided into non-overlapping 8-hour windows, and the alerts in each window populate an artifact graph. G nr (t) is calculated using Steps 1-4 in Section IV and ∆r is calculated using (5) . Any values of ∆r above the preset threshold are agged as anomalous.
Simulated Attack 1
e rst scenario is characteristic of Hurricane Panda, an APT that targets infrastructure companies and is thought to be of Chinese origin [15] . e simulation encompasses network operations from from 9 Nov 2016 to 3 Dec 2016, with the rst a ack command being issued on 30 Nov at 8 PM (UTC), and the nal a ack command occurring on 2 Dec at 10:03 PM (UTC). e a acker in our simulation used database injection to steal authentication information and gain initial access to the network. A er waiting 24 hours, the a acker used this access to steal additional authentication information for other users. Using the credentials stolen from another user, the a acker moved laterally through the network, installing post-exploitation tools (mimikatz 2 ) on several windows machines. Waiting another 24 hours, the a acker then used the post-exploitation tools to disable the rewalls and task schedulers for several windows machines on the network. e entire set of 364,080 IDS alerts can be stored as 263 nodes with 1625 weighted edges in our alert graph representation, illustrating the scalability of our approach. From these alert graphs, ReFex identi ed 112 recursive features based on the weighted node degree, ego-network interconnectivity, ego-network out-degree, and transitivity features. e optimal number of roles is three (Figure 4) . Role descriptions are shown in Figure 5 . Figure 7 shows the role membership over time for three typical alert-eld nodes in the graph; a log le node, an alert rule node, and an IP address node.
Using a manually-de ned threshold of 0.05, our approach identies four anomalies in ∆r (t) (Figure 8 ). e rst two are related to IP address changes (10.10.255.40 appears on 15 Nov, and 10.10.255.49 appears on 18 Nov). e fourth correlates with the start of the attack (the shaded a ack region in Figure 8 ). Of the 364,080 IDS alerts (Snort and OSSEC) produced by the simulation, only 316 are related to the a ack, yet our unsupervised machine learning approach identi ed the start of the a ack as anomalous. e anomalies also appear when restricting the data to include only Snort or OSSEC alerts, suggesting the approach may be robust to the speci c IDSs available on the network.
Simulated Attack 2
e second scenario is characteristic of Energetic Bear (a.k.a. Crouching Yeti, Dragon y, or Havex), an APT that has targeted defense and aviation companies in the U.S. and Canada, and energy rms in Europe [15] . Artifacts in the code suggest Russian-speaking authors, but the origin remains uncertain. In this simulated scenario, the a acker used an email-based phishing a ack to direct a network user to a malicious webpage. While on the webpage, that user's browser downloaded an exploit that gave the a acker access to the machine. Now able to access the network, the a acker installed post-exploitation tools (mimikatz) to establish a persistent foothold and steal authentication information of other users. e a acker then moved laterally throughout the system, using a remote desktop exploit to connect to other machines and create new administrator users on those machines. Having established a way to maintain access and control of these machines, the a acker cleaned up logs and other traces of the a ack.
is second scenario encompasses network operations from 1 Jan 2017 to 4 Feb 2017. e a ack occurred on 31 Jan between 4:57 PM (UTC) and 7:00 PM (UTC). OSSEC generated 702,241 IDS alerts throughout this entire period, which can be represented as 90 nodes and 475 weighted edges in our artifact graph representation. As with the Hurricane Panda scenario, the rst week of data was used as a normalcy period to automatically determine the initial optimal number of nodes, the recursive features, and the role de nitions.
Using a manually-de ned threshold of 0.1, we identi ed three anomalies (Figure 9 ). We found the same three anomalies when considering all alert-eld nodes (Figure 9 , top) and when restricting the analysis to one layer, e.g., only "log le" nodes ( Figure 9, middle) . e third anomaly coincides precisely with the simulated Energetic-Bear-like a ack campaign. is promising result suggests that this formalism for anomaly detection may robustly identify anomalous behavior from di erent types of a acks (e.g., Hurricane-Panda-like, Energetic-Bear-like, etc.).
Note that this a ack-related anomaly does not correlate with an unusual change in the number of alerts (Figure 9 , bo om), as the method is sensitive to alert interconnections (which a ect the nodes and edges of the alert graph), rather than simply alert volume (which a ects the edge weights only). Contrast this with the lack of an anomaly over the 0.1 threshold during the large spike in alert volume near the middle of the dataset. Despite the large e shaded region on the right indicates the simulated attack window. increase in alert volume (perhaps comprising many identical alerts), the alert graph does not change enough to cause anomalous role dynamics. Our graph-based anomaly detector provides information complementary to alert volume analyses; in this example the a ack/anomaly is much easier to nd using role dynamics than volume analyses alone.
DISCUSSION
With any model that learns normal behavior from real training data, there is always some concern that the training data includes an a ack. Including the a ack in the de nition of normal prevents identifying those a acks as anomalous, increasing false negatives.
is is a real risk, but there are some mitigating factors that are useful to consider. e rst mitigating factor is the frequency of malicious activity. If the a acker has gained access to the network but is active only infrequently to disperse any indicators of compromise, the probability of training on a ack-related artifacts is small. If a ack components are included in the training data but are missing from later time windows, this is also an anomaly that could be identi ed by our method. Comparing results from multiple training periods may also provide insight; large unexpected changes unrelated to known network operations should be investigated. e second mitigating factor is escalation. Artifacts from malicious events included in the training data will likely not encompass all phases of the cyber kill chain. Escalating the a ack to new phases should generate new cyber artifacts. As these new artifacts are not included in the training data, they would be identi ed as anomalous.
e third mitigating factor is the ability to detect changes in the a ack methods. Advanced a ackers, such as APTs, build custom tools and frequently adapt their methods [15] . If some of the methods are included in the training data, only those methods will be learned as normal. New a acks not included in the training data would be identi ed as anomalous. e ability to detect new, previously unseen a ack steps is an advantage of our unsupervised approach.
Although the role-dynamics method includes an automatic method for determining the optimal number of nodes, there remain several hyperparameters that must be de ned. ese include which types of cyber artifacts to use (e.g., IDS products), which artifact elds (e.g., IDS alert elds) to populate the graph, the length of the training period, the time window size, and the anomaly threshold. In the examples considered here, these choices were dictated by domain knowledge about the IDS alerts and the limitations of the dataset. As each network con guration di ers, using detailed knowledge about the network may be the best approach for determining the hyperparameters. It may also be possible to optimize these hyperparameters to increase sensitivity to cyber a acks and decrease sensitivity to benign anomalies using either known test cases, or prior a acks on the network. We leave this for future work.
CONCLUSIONS
Graph-based anomaly detection is a promising new approach for detecting cyber a acks from cyber artifacts. In both test scenarios, our method identi ed anomalies corresponding to the start of the a ack. We fused data from several intrusion detection systems into artifact graphs using a novel graph construction based on elds in the triggered alerts, not the network topology. Analyzing the role dynamics in these graphs for simulated Hurricane-Pandalike and Energetic-Bear-like APT datasets, we identi ed a handful of anomalies, including anomalies that coincide with the start of each a ack. Our approach successfully identi ed simulated a acks through anomalies in IDS alert pa erns, and reduced the number of false-positive alerts from thousands to just three false-positive anomalies (in one simulation) and two (in the other simulation). Our results illustrate how graph-node role-dynamics analyses can identify anomalies in IDS alerts, however causal analysis will require further investigation by human analysts.
